The Blind Contracting and Open Procurement Act

A Practical, High-Impact Reform to Cut Favoritism, Reduce Fraud Risk, and Restore Trust in Federal Contracting

Executive Summary

Every year, the federal government buys goods and services on a staggering scale—hundreds of billions of dollars' worth.³ That purchasing power shapes everything from military readiness and healthcare supply chains to local infrastructure and technology modernization. Yet the public's lived experience is often the opposite of "best value": prices that feel inflated, vendors that seem "wired in," and contracts that are difficult to scrutinize until long after the money is gone.¹²

The core problem is not that the U.S. lacks procurement rules. It has many—competition requirements, conflict-of-interest standards, and laws protecting bid information before award.⁹¹¹ But the system still leaks value through a predictable set of failure modes:

• Favoritism and bias during evaluation (conscious or unconscious) can tilt outcomes toward familiar incumbents or politically connected firms.¹⁷¹⁸
• Collusion and bid rigging can quietly turn competition into theater, raising prices while appearing compliant.¹³¹²
• Fragmented and incomplete transparency makes it hard for watchdogs, journalists, and even agencies themselves to connect who won, why they won, and how the contract performed—at the speed needed to stop problems before money is lost.¹²¹⁵
• Shell companies and opaque ownership can obscure conflicts, debarred principals, and hidden control.¹⁹²⁰

Meanwhile, fraud risk is not hypothetical. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimates the federal government may lose hundreds of billions annually to fraud across major programs—an order-of-magnitude signal that detection and prevention mechanisms are not keeping pace with spending complexity.⁵

The Blind Contracting and Open Procurement Act solves this with a two-part upgrade that is conceptually simple, operationally realistic, and designed to integrate with existing federal acquisition law:

1. Blind Contracting (Anonymous Source Selection):
   For covered competitive awards, evaluators score proposals without knowing who wrote them. Vendor identities are sealed and revealed only after technical scoring is completed (or after a structured "technical pass" threshold is met), reducing favoritism and identity-based bias while keeping merit at the center of award decisions.¹

2. Open Procurement (End-to-End Contract Transparency in Standardized Data):
   Contracts are published in machine-readable, standardized form across the full lifecycle—planning, tender, award, contract, and implementation—using a globally recognized standard.¹⁴¹⁵ This includes key award rationale fields and structured redaction rules to protect legitimate trade secrets while still revealing the public-interest essentials: what was bought, from whom, for how much, under what criteria, and with what performance outcomes.

Together, these reforms create a procurement environment where:

• Evaluators are forced to focus on substance, not reputation, connections, or brand recognition.¹
• Collusion is harder to hide, because open data enables anomaly detection (e.g., repeated single-bid awards, suspicious bid spacing, rotating winners).¹³¹⁵
• Oversight becomes real-time, because analysts and the public can track awards, modifications, and delivery signals as structured data—not buried PDFs.²¹⁴

This Act is not a "reinvent procurement" fantasy. International evidence consistently shows that increasing procurement transparency and standardizing data can improve competition and reduce waste. For example, open contracting reforms have been linked to more bidders, fewer direct awards, and measurable savings in multiple settings.¹⁵ And anti-bid-rigging guidance from major institutions emphasizes structured detection and prevention as procurement systems digitize.¹³

Bottom line: the Blind Contracting and Open Procurement Act modernizes federal buying so that merit wins, oversight is timely, and the public can verify outcomes—without dismantling existing acquisition law. It is a direct, implementable answer to a public question that never goes away: "Where did the money go—and why did that company get it?"¹²

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The Problem Statement

1) Scale creates asymmetric opportunity for waste and manipulation

Federal contract expenditures totaled $774 billion in FY2024, based on FPDS-derived reporting.³ Even small percentage improvements translate into large fiscal impact: a 1% gain in value-for-money implies ~$7.7B in annual savings at today's scale.

2) Competition rules exist, but predictable "workarounds" persist

U.S. law requires "full and open competition" unless a statutory exception applies.⁹ In practice, discretion can still concentrate awards via:

• restrictive specifications,
• evaluation subjectivity,
• repeated reliance on limited-competition procedures,
• informational advantages for incumbents.

Empirical research across procurement systems finds that discretion and weak transparency correlate with higher favoritism risk and poorer outcomes.¹⁷¹⁸ While the U.S. context differs by statute and oversight institutions, the mechanism is consistent: where evaluators can justify subjective distinctions without transparent, structured accountability, favoritism becomes harder to detect and deter.

3) Pre-award confidentiality exists, but "identity neutrality" does not

The Procurement Integrity Act and implementing FAR provisions restrict disclosure of contractor bid/proposal and source selection information.¹¹ These protections prevent leaks and unfair competitive advantage. But they do not ensure that evaluators are insulated from vendor identity effects (brand priming, incumbent comfort, political pressure, conflicts of interest). The current regime protects the market; it does not fully protect the decision.

4) Opaque ownership and layered subcontracting obstruct conflict detection

When contractors operate through affiliates or pass-through entities, beneficial ownership opacity can obscure:

• debarred or sanctioned principals,
• conflicts of interest,
• repeat offenders cycling through entity names.

Federal procurement has eligibility systems (e.g., SAM registration), but ownership visibility remains uneven—especially when ownership reporting requirements are politically contested and legally dynamic.¹⁹²⁰ A procurement-specific ownership disclosure requirement—narrowly tailored to contracting eligibility and protected by strong safeguards—can restore this critical oversight capability.

5) Fragmented transparency limits real-time accountability

The U.S. already publishes spending and award information (e.g., FPDS/USAspending). But major oversight gaps persist:

• key documents are often PDFs,
• redactions are inconsistent,
• award rationale is difficult to compare across agencies,
• performance and modification data can lag or be incomplete.

Modern oversight requires linked, standardized, machine-readable procurement lifecycle data—not a patchwork of portals and document dumps.¹⁴¹⁵

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The Proposed Reform

Part 1: Blind Contracting (Anonymous Source Selection)

Covered procurements:
Competitive source selections above a threshold (e.g., $10M), excluding emergency/national security exceptions and limited-competition procedures justified under existing statutes.

Mechanics:

1. Vendor registration with a procurement clearinghouse that issues anonymous bidder codes (e.g., ABC-2025-001234).
2. Vendors submit proposals without visible identity markers—company logos, officer names, and branding are stripped or masked.
3. Evaluators score technical merit using only anonymous codes. Evaluators do not see vendor names, past performance client lists, or identifiable branding.
4. After technical scoring is complete (or after a structured threshold is met), identity is revealed to confirm eligibility, evaluate past performance, and conduct responsibility determinations.
5. Final award decision incorporates both the blind technical score and the post-reveal responsibility/past performance evaluation, using a structured, transparent weighting framework published in the solicitation.

Key safeguards:

• Conflict-of-interest declarations are still required (evaluators disclose relationships that could create bias even without knowing specific vendor identities during initial evaluation).
• Legal review ensures compliance with existing FAR and statutory requirements.
• Small business and socioeconomic credit can be applied post-reveal or flagged via metadata that does not identify the specific firm during blind evaluation.

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Part 2: Open Procurement (End-to-End Contract Transparency in Standardized Data)

Scope:
All federal contracts above a threshold (e.g., $250K), with structured phase-in for smaller awards and simplified procedures.

Standard:
Adoption of the Open Contracting Data Standard (OCDS) or a compatible U.S. federal standard that provides machine-readable, linked data across the procurement lifecycle:

• Planning: requirements, market research signals
• Tender: solicitation documents, amendment notices
• Award: who won, evaluation criteria summary, award rationale
• Contract: final contract terms, key performance indicators
• Implementation: modifications, delivery milestones, closeout

Publication requirements:

• Within 30 days of award: structured data release including vendor identity, contract value, key evaluation factors, and award rationale summary.
• Real-time updates for modifications, extensions, and performance milestones.
• Annual performance snapshots with delivery outcomes and final costs.

Redaction framework:

• Protected: bona fide trade secrets (chemical formulas, proprietary algorithms, confidential business strategies) with structured, auditable justification.
• Public: vendor identity, contract amount, scope of work, evaluation criteria, key performance terms, modification history, and delivery outcomes.

Beneficial ownership disclosure (procurement-specific):
Contractors awarded covered contracts must disclose:

• Ultimate beneficial owners (individuals with ≥25% ownership or control),
• Debarred or sanctioned principals in ownership chain,
• Affiliate relationships that could create conflicts.

This disclosure is limited to procurement eligibility (not general corporate transparency) and protected by appropriate privacy and security safeguards. It does not resurrect the rescinded FinCEN BOI rule but creates a targeted, procurement-specific transparency requirement directly tied to federal contracting eligibility.²⁰²¹

Implementation Roadmap (Phased, Realistic, Adaptive)

Phase 1: Pilot and Infrastructure Build (Months 1–18)

• Agency selection: 2–3 lead agencies (e.g., GSA, DOD, HHS) volunteer for pilot.
• Category focus: high-spend, high-competition categories (IT services, facilities management, medical supplies).
• Threshold: pilot with contracts >$10M (blind contracting) and >$1M (open procurement data).
• Tech build: develop or adapt vendor anonymization tools, OCDS-compatible data publishing infrastructure.
• Training: evaluator training on blind evaluation procedures, legal review of safeguards.

Phase 2: Expansion and Refinement (Months 19–36)

• Expand agencies: add 5–10 more agencies based on pilot results.
• Lower thresholds: reduce to $5M (blind contracting) and $250K (open procurement).
• Automation: integrate anonymization, data extraction, and compliance checks into existing e-procurement systems.
• Feedback loops: adjust redaction rules, evaluation templates, and disclosure forms based on real-world experience.

Phase 3: Full Federal Rollout (Months 37–60)

• Governmentwide implementation with scaled thresholds, standardized training, and automated compliance.
• Public analytics dashboard: launch unified portal for real-time procurement data, searchable by vendor, agency, contract type, and performance outcome.
• Continuous improvement: annual reviews, legislative adjustments as needed, integration with other transparency and anti-corruption measures.

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Impact Analysis

1) Competition and price effects

Evidence from open contracting implementations indicates that transparency and standardized data can:

• increase bidder participation and reduce direct awards,
• improve oversight effectiveness,
• generate measurable savings.

Examples reported across open contracting programs include increases in average bidders and reduced amendments/change orders after reforms.¹⁵ In Colombia's system-level reforms, open contracting measures were associated with a measurable increase in average bidders and a reduction in direct awards.¹⁵ In Paraguay, reforms are associated with a reduction in contract amendments and improved process outcomes.¹⁵

2) Anti-collusion deterrence

Bid rigging is a known and persistent threat in procurement markets. OECD guidance emphasizes procurement design and detection measures to reduce collusion risk.¹³ Open, standardized datasets make it materially easier to detect collusion indicators, support DOJ enforcement, and deter would-be conspirators by increasing the probability of exposure.¹²¹³

3) Fraud-risk reduction and faster intervention

GAO's fraud-loss estimates across federal activity highlight the scale of preventable leakage when detection is delayed.⁵ Open procurement data—published as structured, linkable records—supports faster anomaly detection, earlier audits, and more targeted enforcement.¹⁵

4) Projected economic impact (conservative scenarios)

Using FY2024 federal contract expenditures (~$774B) as the base:³

• 0.5% improvement in value-for-money: ≈ $3.9B/year
• 1.0% improvement: ≈ $7.7B/year
• 2.0% improvement: ≈ $15.5B/year

These are not speculative "new revenue" claims; they represent plausible reductions in overpayment, collusion premiums, avoidable amendments, and favoritism-driven inefficiency—consistent with observed transparency-linked savings in other contexts.¹⁵¹⁶

5) Implementation feasibility and administrative burden

This Act is designed for pragmatic rollout:

• Pilot in high-spend categories and select agencies first (e.g., IT services, facilities, medical supplies).
• Integrate with existing systems (SAM, FPDS/USAspending, agency e-procurement tools) via standard APIs.
• Provide templates, automated compliance checks, and phased thresholds to reduce burden on small businesses.¹²

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Conclusion

Federal procurement is one of the government's largest and most corruption-exposed interfaces with private money.⁷ It is also one of the easiest places to modernize because the transaction record already exists—it is simply not consistently structured, linked, or published in a way that enables real-time accountability.¹²¹⁵

The Blind Contracting and Open Procurement Act addresses the two biggest practical drivers of distrust and waste:

1. Decision integrity (who wins and why) through blind evaluation,¹ and
2. Lifecycle transparency (what happened after award) through standardized open data.¹⁴¹⁵

At $774B/year in federal contract expenditures,³ the U.S. cannot afford procurement systems that are hard to audit, easy to game, and slow to correct. This reform is urgent not because it is radical—but because it is obvious: merit-based evaluation and verifiable transparency should be the default standard for spending public money.¹²

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Reference List

1. Document B: "12 - Blind Contracting and Open Procurement Act" (draft source text). (Local file)
   Link: sandbox:/mnt/data/12%20-%20Blind%20Contracting%20and%20Open%20Procurement%20Act.docx

2. Document A: "Blind Contracting and Open Procurement Source Library" (compiled sources & notes). (Local file)
   Link: sandbox:/mnt/data/Blind%20Contracting%20and%20Open%20Procurement%20Source%20Library.md.docx

3. U.S. General Services Administration (GSA). Executive Summary: FY 2024 FPDS GSA Report (derived from FPDS, includes FY2024 contract expenditures).
   Link: https://www.gsa.gov/system/files/Executive%20Summary_%20FY%202024%20FPDS%20GSA%20Report.pdf

4. U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Federal Contracting: DOD and Other Agencies Need to Take Actions to Improve Data Quality (GAO report on contracting data quality).
   Link: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-107469

5. GAO. Fraud Risk Management: 2018–2022 Data Show Federal Government Loses an Estimated $233 Billion to $521 Billion Annually to Fraud (GAO-24-105833).
   Link: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-105833

6. OECD. Government at a Glance 2025 (public procurement share of GDP / government expenditure, cross-country).
   Link: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/government-at-a-glance-2025_9e6f4c10-en.html

7. World Bank. Curbing fraud, corruption, and collusion in public procurement (summary evidence and cost impacts).
   Link: https://blogs.worldbank.org/governance/curbing-fraud-corruption-and-collusion-public-procurement

8. European Commission / PwC. Identifying and reducing corruption in public procurement in the EU (study on corruption impacts and procurement risk).
   Link: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0af9dfa9-8cc7-4e14-a0d5-1d3f4377ed4f

9. U.S. Code. Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) — "full and open competition" requirements (41 U.S.C. § 3301).
   Link: https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title41-section3301

10. Acquisition.gov. FAR 15.304 — Evaluation factors and significant subfactors (source selection structure).
    Link: https://www.acquisition.gov/far/15.304

11. Acquisition.gov / U.S. Code. Procurement Integrity Act and implementing FAR provisions (41 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2107; FAR 3.104).
    Link: https://www.acquisition.gov/far/3.104

12. U.S. Department of Justice. Procurement Collusion Strike Force (PCSF) (bid rigging enforcement initiative).
    Link: https://www.justice.gov/procurement-collusion-strike-force

13. OECD. Guidelines for Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement (2025 Update) (EN).
    Link: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/09/oecd-guidelines-for-fighting-bid-rigging-in-public-procurement-2025-update_127880ea/cbe05a56-en.pdf

14. Open Contracting Partnership. Open Contracting Data Standard (OCDS) (standard specification and guidance).
    Link: https://standard.open-contracting.org/latest/en/

15. Open Contracting Partnership. Open contracting: impact and evidence (case studies, competition and savings snapshots).
    Link: https://www.open-contracting.org/impact/evidence/

16. Open Spending EU Coalition. The collection of evidence on open spending (EU-wide studies; single-bid risks and savings estimates).
    Link: https://www.open-spending.eu/evidence/the-collection-of-evidence-on-open-spending/

17. Szűcs, F. Discretion and Favoritism in Public Procurement (Journal of the European Economic Association, 2024).
    Link: https://academic.oup.com/jeea/article/22/2/713/7348152

18. Coviello, D., & Gagliarducci, S. Tenure in Office and Public Procurement (evidence on political incentives and procurement outcomes).
    Link: https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/600181468149295694/pdf/779510BRI0Box30OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY090.pdf

19. Goldin, C., & Rouse, C. Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of "Blind" Auditions on Female Musicians (selection-bias evidence via anonymity).
    Link: https://collaborate.princeton.edu/en/publications/orchestrating-impartiality-the-impact-of-blind-auditions-on-femal/

20. FinCEN. Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting (updated March 2025; interim final rule context).
    Link: https://www.fincen.gov/beneficial-ownership-information-reporting

21. U.S. Department of the Treasury. Press Release: Publication of Interim Final Rule Removing BOI Reporting Requirements for U.S. Companies and U.S. Persons (March 26, 2025).
    Link: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0060

22. Pew Research Center. Public views on government transparency and trust (importance of transparency in democratic governance).
    Link: https://www.pewresearch.org/

23. Reuters. U.S. Treasury lifts BOI reporting requirement for U.S. firms under AML law (March 26, 2025 reporting; contextual).
    Link: https://www.reuters.com/business/us-treasury-lifts-reporting-requirement-us-firms-anti-money-laundering-law-2025-03-26/

    Changelog

• December 27, 2024 — Fixed MDX syntax errors (removed invalid {#id} heading anchors)
• December 26, 2024 — Initial draft published