Five-Year Revolving Door Ban

A Five-Year Cooling-Off Period and Influence Transparency Framework for Federal Officials

Executive Summary

When a public official leaves office and quickly begins selling access, insider knowledge, and personal relationships back to the government, the public sees a system that rewards connections over merit. This is the "revolving door": a pipeline from public power to private influence that can quietly distort priorities, weaken oversight, and erode trust in democratic institutions.¹³

The United States already has post-employment rules—but they are fragmented, uneven, and easy to evade. Members of the U.S. House face a one-year lobbying contact ban; Senators face two years.² Yet these rules primarily target formal lobbying contacts, while modern influence campaigns often flow through "strategic consulting," "advisory" roles, and other work that shapes policy outcomes without triggering registration or clear public disclosure.³⁴

This paper proposes a single, enforceable reform that combines the strongest mechanisms from the two user-provided drafts ("Document A" and "Document B") into one coherent model: a Five-Year Revolving Door Ban paired with a Post-Employment Influence Transparency system.¹² The core idea is simple:

If you recently held significant public power, you should not be paid to influence the federal government for at least five years—and any covered influence work must be disclosed in standardized, machine-readable form.

This is not a "ban on jobs." Former officials can still work in the private sector, teach, write, practice law, or contribute expertise—so long as they are not being paid to pressure or steer federal decision-making during the cooling-off period. The reform focuses on compensated influence—the activity most corrosive to public confidence and most likely to produce hidden conflicts.⁵

Why five years? Because the strongest influence from personal networks and insider leverage is typically greatest soon after leaving office, and the public overwhelmingly supports longer cooling-off periods. One major national survey found large bipartisan majorities favoring extending the waiting period for former Members of Congress to five years or more.⁶

The benefits are practical and measurable:

• Cleaner decisions: fewer incentives for officials to "audition" for lucrative post-government influence jobs while still in office.⁵
• More transparency: visibility into "shadow influence" roles that currently evade standard lobbying disclosure.³⁴
• Real enforcement: today's compliance pipeline is widely viewed as weak and slow, with referrals and penalties often limited.⁷
• Global precedent: comparable democracies use multi-year restrictions and publish waivers and compliance actions.⁸

In short: this reform modernizes U.S. ethics and lobbying rules to match modern influence tactics—closing loopholes without restricting legitimate speech, civic participation, or ordinary employment.⁹

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The Problem Statement

1) Existing federal post-employment rules are uneven and narrow

Federal law already regulates certain post-employment conduct, including restrictions on representational activities by former officers and employees.¹⁰ For Members of Congress specifically, current law includes targeted "cooling-off" bans on lobbying contacts: one year for Representatives and two years for Senators.² These time horizons are short relative to the persistence of personal networks, committee familiarity, and relationship capital created by senior service.

2) The regulatory perimeter is porous because "lobbying" is defined and triggered narrowly

Under federal lobbying law, registration and reporting hinge on definitions that can be avoided in practice—most notably the concept of who qualifies as a "lobbyist" and whether lobbying constitutes a threshold share of work time.³ This creates predictable evasion: influence work can be shifted to "advising," "strategy," "message development," "coalition management," and other forms of paid support that aim to shape outcomes while avoiding formal triggers.⁴

Crucially, guidance materials recognize that "lobbying activities" can include background work supporting lobbying contacts—but the public transparency regime still depends on registration and reporting structures that can be sidestepped by design.⁴

3) Enforcement incentives and capacity are misaligned

Disclosure and ethics rules are only as effective as their enforcement. Government reviews have repeatedly emphasized the challenges of compliance oversight and the limited consequences associated with noncompliance in the federal lobbying disclosure system.⁷ Weak enforcement predictably produces weak deterrence: where the probability of meaningful penalty is low, evasion becomes rational.

4) Empirical research shows connections have quantifiable value—creating strong incentives for influence-selling

Peer-reviewed research on lobbying and political connections finds that access is economically valuable. One prominent study estimated that when a lobbyist's connected legislator leaves office, the lobbyist's revenue associated with that connection falls substantially—evidence that personal ties can be monetized.¹¹ This is the core governance risk: decisions may be shaped by who has "inside channels," not by whose argument is best.

5) The legitimacy cost is systemic: trust and perceived fairness decline when influence looks purchasable

Public trust is sensitive to perceived capture—especially when the system appears to operate for insiders. Credible survey research consistently finds majorities believe interest groups and lobbyists exert too much influence, reinforcing the need for reforms that are both enforceable and publicly legible.¹³

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The Proposed Reform

This proposal merges the drafts into a single statutory framework with two integrated pillars:

1. A five-year cooling-off restriction on compensated influence, and
2. A disclosure and compliance architecture that makes "shadow influence" visible and enforceable.¹²

A. Covered Officials

A Covered Official should include, at minimum:

• Members of Congress (House and Senate)
• Senior congressional staff (e.g., chiefs of staff, committee staff directors, counsels, senior professional staff)
• Senior executive branch officials (e.g., Senate-confirmed officers and other senior "covered" positions as defined in statute)

Rationale: influence risk tracks authority, access, and decision proximity—not merely title.

B. Prohibited Conduct During the Five-Year Cooling-Off Period

For five years after leaving covered service, a Covered Official may not, for compensation, engage in Covered Influence Activities directed at the federal government.

Covered Influence Activities should be defined to include:

1. Direct lobbying contacts (communications to covered federal officials intended to influence legislation, regulation, procurement, grants, enforcement, or policy)
2. Arranging or facilitating meetings between private actors and federal decision-makers
3. Supervising, directing, or materially supporting lobbying contacts or influence campaigns (including strategy and message development intended for federal influence)
4. Behind-the-scenes influence services where the purpose is to influence federal action—even if the former official does not personally make the contact

This definition reaches modern influence practice: you can be paid for expertise, but not for selling access and insider leverage back to the government.

C. What IS Allowed (Protected Activities)

This restriction does not prohibit:

• Ordinary private employment (law, business, teaching, consulting on non-influence matters)
• Public speaking and writing on policy topics
• Civic participation (testifying at public hearings, signing letters, participation in advocacy organizations as a member)
• Legal representation when serving in a purely legal capacity (not strategic lobbying wrapped in legal-sounding titles)
• Pro bono or uncompensated assistance, including for nonprofits, where no financial gain is involved

This is a bright-line rule: if you are being paid to influence federal decision-making, you must comply with the ban and disclosure requirements. Otherwise, your activity is presumptively lawful.

D. Post-Employment Influence Registry (PEIR)

Even after the five-year cooling-off period has ended, any Covered Official who engages in Covered Influence Activities at any point following covered service must file a detailed Post-Employment Influence Report (PEIR) within 30 days of beginning such work, with quarterly updates.

The PEIR must include:

• Former official's name, former position(s), and dates of service
• Current employer/client (or contracting firm)
• Nature of influence activity (lobbying, strategy, advisory)
• Federal agencies, committees, or offices targeted
• Subject matter areas
• Estimated compensation range
• Any waivers granted or invoked

The registry should be:

• Publicly searchable online (machine-readable, bulk downloadable)
• Linked to existing lobbying disclosure databases for cross-reference
• Updated quarterly, with penalty for late or false filings

This creates a permanent transparency pipeline: even after the five-year restriction lifts, the public and oversight institutions can see who is being paid to influence and on whose behalf.

E. Enforcement Mechanisms

Recommended enforcement architecture:

• Administrative enforcement authority (civil penalties) vested in an ethics/compliance office with investigatory capacity
• Audit authority for PEIR filings and targeted cross-checks with lobbying disclosures
• Civil penalties scaled to deterrence (e.g., per-violation fines, disgorgement tied to compensation, enhanced penalties for willful evasion)
• Debarment-style sanctions for repeat violators (e.g., temporary prohibition on lobbying registrations or contracting eligibility, where legally appropriate)

F. Waivers: Narrow, Public, and Justified

A waiver mechanism can prevent undue hardship but must not become a loophole. Any waiver should be:

• Granted only under a written, published standard
• Published with a public explanation and scope limitation
• Time-bounded and revocable upon noncompliance

Comparable regimes publish exemption decisions and reasons—demonstrating that transparency and flexibility can coexist.⁸

G. Constitutional and Legal Design (Risk Management)

This proposal is structured to withstand scrutiny by focusing on:

• Conduct (compensated influence work), not viewpoints
• Disclosure tailored to transparency goals, consistent with recognized government interests in disclosure regimes⁹
• Clear definitions and safe harbors to avoid vagueness and chilling effects

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Impact Analysis

1) Governance and integrity benefits

Reduced conflict incentives while in office. A five-year cooling-off period lowers the incentive to shape decisions today for a high-paying influence role tomorrow.⁵

Improved transparency for modern influence roles. PEIR transforms "strategic consulting" opacity into structured disclosure, allowing oversight institutions and journalists to see influence pathways that currently evade public detection.⁴

2) Economic and administrative effects

Reduced rent-seeking and transaction costs. Where access is monetized, firms spend on "getting to yes" rather than building better products or making better arguments. Evidence that lobbying value depends on personal connections implies that reducing short-term monetization opportunities can reduce access-based spending.¹¹

Implementation costs are bounded and predictable. PEIR is a standardized reporting system that can be run with modern data tooling. Costs are primarily staff time for compliance reviews, audits, and publishing.

3) Evidence of feasibility and international precedent

Canada uses a five-year post-employment lobbying prohibition for designated senior officials, along with published guidance and exemption processes.⁸ This demonstrates that multi-year restrictions can be implemented in a modern democracy while preserving normal private employment.

The OECD has also issued guidance emphasizing the importance of managing post-public employment risks as part of comprehensive integrity systems—supporting the global governance logic of cooling-off and transparency.¹²

4) Public support and democratic legitimacy

Longer cooling-off periods are not a niche idea. Polling indicates strong support for extending the waiting period for former Members of Congress to five years or longer.⁶ That level of public agreement suggests this reform can be framed as a legitimacy measure—an institutional guardrail rather than a partisan weapon.

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Conclusion

The revolving door is not merely a "bad look." It is a structural vulnerability that invites paid access, hidden conflicts, and policy outcomes that can drift away from public priorities. Existing U.S. rules create partial friction—short cooling-off periods and narrow triggers—while modern influence practice has evolved faster than disclosure and enforcement.

A Five-Year Revolving Door Ban paired with a Post-Employment Influence Registry is a realistic, enforceable modernization. It preserves free speech and ordinary employment while drawing a bright line against the sale of insider influence—when it is most potent and most damaging to public trust.

If democratic legitimacy depends on the public believing decisions are made on the merits, then reducing paid access and making influence visible is not optional—it is foundational.¹³

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Reference List

1. Document A (user-provided draft) - Five-Year Revolving Door Ban (MD draft).
   Note: Original sandbox link not converted for web deployment.

2. Document B (user-provided draft) - Five-Year Revolving Door Ban Act (draft bill text).
   Note: Original sandbox link not converted for web deployment.

3. Lobbying Disclosure Act definition of "lobbyist" and thresholds - Cornell LII: 2 U.S.C. § 1602.
   Link: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/2/1602

4. U.S. Senate guidance clarifying that "lobbying activities" can include support/background work - U.S. Senate LD-203 Guidance (PDF).
   Link: https://www.senate.gov/legislative/resources/pdf/ldaguidance.pdf

5. CRS discussion of revolving door risks and policy options - CRS Report (public copy): "The Revolving Door: Lobbying Restrictions on Former Federal Officials."
   Link: https://everycrsreport.com/reports/R42728.html

6. Public polling indicating broad support for extending waiting periods to five years or more - Program for Public Consultation (UMD), "Revolving Door Reforms" survey findings.
   Link: https://publicconsultation.org/reform-consideration/revolving-door-reforms/

7. Federal oversight findings on lobbying disclosure compliance processes and enforcement limitations - GAO: "Lobbying Disclosure Act: Congress Should Improve Oversight of Lobbying Compliance."
   Link: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-106987

8. Comparable five-year post-employment lobbying prohibition and published exemption framework - Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada: "5-year post-employment prohibition on lobbying."
   Link: https://www.lobbycanada.gc.ca/en/rules/the-lobbying-act/5-year-post-employment-prohibition-on-lobbying/

9. Constitutional analysis supporting transparency regimes and disclosure rationales - Congressional Research Service: "First Amendment Limitations on Disclosure Requirements" (IF12388).
   Link: https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12388

10. General federal post-employment restrictions framework - Cornell LII: 18 U.S.C. § 207.
    Link: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/207

11. Empirical evidence that political connections have measurable economic value in lobbying markets - Blanes i Vidal, Draca, Fons-Rosen (2012), "Revolving Door Lobbyists" (AER / RePEc record).
    Link: https://econpapers.repec.org/article/aeaaecrev/v_3a102_3ay_3a2012_3ai_3a7_3ap_3a3731-3748.htm

12. International integrity guidance emphasizing post-public employment risk management - OECD (2017), "Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity" (PDF).
    Link: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/recommendation-of-the-council-on-public-integrity_9789264276515-en.html

13. Public perception research on interest group/lobbyist influence and democratic legitimacy concerns - Pew Research Center reporting on perceived influence of special interests/lobbyists.
    Link: https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2019/05/14/majority-of-americans-say-special-interests-have-too-much-influence-on-politics/

Changelog

• December 28, 2024 — Initial draft published