Independent Anti-Corruption Enforcement

Executive Summary

Transparency without enforcement is theater. You can require financial disclosure, protect whistleblowers, and track lobbying — but if violations face no consequences, rules become optional. The current system puts enforcement in the hands of the same officials and institutions the rules are meant to constrain.

This reform creates independent enforcement capacity that can investigate and prosecute corruption regardless of who's involved. The goal isn't to create a new bureaucracy, but to ensure that ethics rules have teeth and apply equally to everyone.

The Problem

Current anti-corruption enforcement is fragmented, conflicted, and inconsistent:

Structural conflicts:

• DOJ reports to the President, creating conflicts when investigating executive branch
• Congressional ethics committees are controlled by the bodies they oversee
• Agency inspectors general can be fired by agency heads
• State and local prosecutors have limited jurisdiction over federal corruption

Uneven enforcement:

• High-profile cases get attention; routine violations go unpunished
• Political considerations influence prosecution decisions
• Resource constraints mean most violations aren't investigated
• Plea deals and settlements avoid public trials and precedent-setting rulings

Coordination failures:

• Multiple agencies with overlapping jurisdiction
• No central clearinghouse for corruption information
• Investigations stall at jurisdictional boundaries
• Foreign corruption often escapes domestic enforcement

Accountability gaps:

• Former officials face limited accountability after leaving office
• Immunity doctrines protect many official actions
• Statute of limitations allows running out the clock
• Civil penalties often less than profits from corruption

The Fix

Create an independent anti-corruption enforcement infrastructure:

1. Independent enforcement authority — Entity with prosecutorial power that doesn't report to officials it might investigate
2. Protected tenure — Leadership can only be removed for cause, not political reasons
3. Adequate resources — Dedicated funding not subject to annual appropriations battles
4. Comprehensive jurisdiction — Authority over federal corruption wherever it occurs
5. Coordination mandate — Central role in organizing enforcement across agencies

How It Works

Structure:

• Independent agency outside normal executive chain of command
• Director appointed for fixed term, removable only for cause
• Bipartisan commission for oversight and major policy decisions
• Separate offices for investigation and prosecution

Jurisdiction:

• All federal corruption offenses
• Violations of federal ethics laws
• Federal election law enforcement (transferred from FEC)
• Coordination authority over related state prosecutions

Powers:

• Subpoena authority for documents and testimony
• Grand jury access
• Ability to bring criminal charges
• Civil enforcement and penalty authority
• Asset forfeiture for corruption proceeds

Protections:

• Employees protected from political retaliation
• Investigative files protected from inappropriate access
• Whistleblower channel for reporting internal problems
• Regular public reporting on activities

Safeguards & Anti-Abuse Design

Against politicization:

• Fixed terms for leadership insulated from election cycles
• Bipartisan appointment process requiring Senate confirmation
• Removal only for cause with judicial review
• Transparent prioritization criteria for case selection

Against overreach:

• Clear jurisdictional boundaries
• Due process protections for targets
• Judicial oversight of major enforcement actions
• Congressional oversight of budget and operations

Against capture:

• Ethics rules for staff prevent revolving door
• Conflicts-of-interest recusal requirements
• External review of closed investigations
• Protected channel for reporting internal misconduct

Against weaponization:

• Prioritization based on severity, not politics
• Public criteria for case selection
• Requirement to explain declinations in significant cases
• Pattern analysis to detect selective enforcement

Critics' Strongest Arguments

"Independent agencies are constitutionally questionable."

This is a serious concern. The Supreme Court has limited how far Congress can insulate officials from presidential control. But precedents exist: independent counsels, the Federal Reserve, and other agencies operate with significant independence. Careful structuring can preserve constitutional validity while achieving meaningful independence.

"This creates a powerful unaccountable entity."

Accountability comes through multiple channels: congressional oversight, judicial review, bipartisan commission, and public transparency. The goal isn't to create an unaccountable body, but to remove conflicts of interest. Multiple accountability mechanisms check against abuse while preserving independence from political interference.

"Current institutions could work if properly resourced and led."

Maybe, but the structural conflicts remain. Even with excellent people and adequate resources, DOJ investigating the President or congressional ethics committees disciplining colleagues face inherent problems. Independence removes those conflicts rather than trying to overcome them through goodwill.

"This will chill legitimate political activity."

Clear rules help, not hurt. When officials know what's prohibited and that violations will be prosecuted, they can confidently engage in legitimate activities. Uncertainty about rules and selective enforcement are what chill activity. Consistent, predictable enforcement actually provides clearer guidance.

Implementation Plan

First 100 days:

• Executive order establishing interagency corruption task force
• Review and strengthen IG independence protections
• Identify legislative sponsors for statutory reform

First year:

• Develop detailed legislative proposal
• Congressional hearings on independent enforcement models
• International consultation on anti-corruption best practices

Legislative component (requires Congress):

• Establish independent enforcement authority
• Define jurisdiction and powers
• Create appointment and removal protections
• Authorize funding mechanism

Years 2-3:

• Stand up new organization
• Transfer relevant functions from existing agencies
• Develop prioritization criteria and operational guidelines
• Begin operations with initial case intake

Long-term:

• Constitutional challenges likely; structure designed to survive judicial review
• Periodic reauthorization to ensure congressional oversight
• Regular evaluation of effectiveness and adjustment

Evidence & Sources

Primary sources:

• Ethics in Government Act provisions on independent counsels
• Inspector General Act and amendments
• Existing anti-corruption statutes (bribery, honest services fraud, etc.)

International models:

• Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption
• UK Serious Fraud Office
• International anti-corruption conventions (UNCAC, OECD)

Research and analysis:

• Studies of independent counsel experience
• Comparative analysis of anti-corruption enforcement models
• Academic literature on institutional design for corruption control

Changelog

• December 26, 2024 — Initial draft published