The Independent Public Integrity Enforcement Act

A Cross-Branch Integrity Commission + Statutory Special Counsel Triggers to Depoliticize Corruption Enforcement

Executive Summary

Americans increasingly believe the federal government is corrupt—and they're not subtle about it. In nationally representative polling, roughly 7 in 10 U.S. adults say "corruption in the federal government" is a major problem.¹⁰ Trust in government remains historically low, and the legitimacy cost is enormous: when the public assumes self-dealing is "how Washington works," every policy debate becomes suspect, regardless of which party holds power.^{11 12}

The core issue is not that the United States lacks ethics laws. It is that enforcement is fragmented, often internal, and structurally conflicted. In the executive branch, the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) provides direction, guidance, and program oversight—but day-to-day ethics administration and enforcement power is largely embedded within agencies and ultimately constrained by leadership chains.^{3 4 5} In Congress, ethics enforcement is necessarily shaped by constitutional protections and internal discipline mechanisms; outside investigative capacity exists but remains limited in scope and relies on referrals and internal committee decisions.⁶ At the criminal enforcement layer, the Department of Justice (DOJ) must often investigate officials who influence DOJ leadership, budgets, appointments, and institutional priorities. Current "special counsel" rules exist in regulation, but appointment is discretionary and depends on DOJ leadership judgment at the very moment conflict is most acute.⁷

This paper proposes a single reform that merges the strongest mechanics from two complementary designs: (1) an Independent Public Integrity Commission with cross-branch jurisdiction for intake, investigation, civil enforcement, and referrals; and (2) a statutory special counsel trigger system that requires independent prosecution decisions when conflicts are predictable and severe.^{1 2} The reform also mandates a machine-readable Public Integrity Enforcement Dataset to replace today's opaque, ad hoc visibility into how cases are handled, declined, or delayed.²

The solution is simple in principle: build an enforcement architecture that is independent enough to be credible, constrained enough to be constitutional, and transparent enough to be accountable. It does not "weaponize" government; it standardizes guardrails that apply to every administration and every party—so that corruption investigations are neither buried nor turned into political theater.^{1 2}

If enacted, the reform is expected to produce four categories of benefits:

Deterrence: raising the probability that real conflicts and corruption are detected and punished, reducing incentives for self-dealing.

Institutional resilience: preventing political interference or resource starvation from quietly disabling public integrity enforcement.^{17 18}

Economic protection: corruption and procurement manipulation can impose large, recurring costs; even modest reductions yield outsized public value.^{13 14}

Legitimacy repair: the public can disagree on policy while agreeing the rules are fairly enforced—an essential foundation for democratic stability.^{10 11 12}

The Problem Statement

1) Public trust is collapsing under perceived corruption

A large majority of Americans identify corruption as a major federal problem in reputable polling.¹⁰ Trust indicators remain low across multiple long-running measures.^{11 12} This is not a "communications" problem. It is a structural enforcement credibility problem: when the public cannot see consistent, nonpartisan accountability, they assume impunity.

2) Ethics oversight is real—but enforcement is structurally constrained

Executive branch: OGE was designed to provide direction and oversight for preventing conflicts of interest, and to support agency ethics programs through rules, advice, education, and disclosure systems.^{3 4} But agency ethics enforcement is embedded inside agencies and is influenced by internal leadership incentives; moreover, criminal violations necessarily depend on DOJ decisions.^{4 5} This creates predictable failure modes for high-ranking or politically sensitive misconduct: enforcement becomes discretionary at precisely the point the public needs it to be predictable.

Legislative branch: Congressional ethics is shaped by separation of powers and the Speech or Debate Clause. External investigative support exists (e.g., the House's independent fact-finding office), but discipline and many enforcement outcomes remain routed through internal committees and political processes.⁶ The result is an accountability posture that the public often perceives as self-policing.

3) Criminal public integrity enforcement is vulnerable to political control and internal throttling

DOJ's Public Integrity Section (PIN) and related policies are essential, but the enforcement pipeline can be influenced through staffing, prioritization, and internal gatekeeping—and those controls are held by political leadership or appointees. DOJ's internal policies (including consultation and approval requirements in sensitive cases) are significant guardrails, but as internal policy they can be altered, narrowly interpreted, or deprioritized.⁸

Recent reporting has highlighted how easily public integrity capacity can be reduced through quiet organizational changes.¹⁷ Additional reporting suggests corruption enforcement units can be reorganized or disbanded—exactly the kind of vulnerability that fuels public cynicism that "the powerful police themselves."¹⁸

4) Economic damage is substantial, recurring, and hard to audit

Corruption and favoritism distort public procurement—the government function widely recognized as especially vulnerable to mismanagement and abuse.¹⁴ Some global anti-corruption authorities and development institutions describe corruption as adding large percentage costs to procurement or siphoning off value, particularly where oversight is weak.¹³ Even if any single estimate varies by context, the direction is clear: public integrity failures are not just moral failures; they are fiscal leaks.

The Proposed Reform

This reform combines two mutually reinforcing mechanisms:

Independent Public Integrity Commission (IPIC) — cross-branch intake, investigations, civil enforcement, and referrals.¹

Independent Special Counsel Trigger System — statutory, automatic safeguards for high-conflict criminal investigations.²

A) Establish an Independent Public Integrity Commission (IPIC)

Mission: Ensure credible, nonpartisan enforcement of federal public integrity rules by creating a body structurally insulated from day-to-day political control, while remaining bounded by constitutional limits.¹

Core functions:

Centralized intake: a single portal for credible allegations involving senior federal officials across branches (ethics violations, disclosure noncompliance, misuse of office, procurement favoritism red flags, etc.).^{1 2}

Independent investigations: authority to collect records, interview witnesses, and conduct investigations with professionalized standards and due process.¹

Civil enforcement: administrative and civil actions for enforceable ethics and disclosure requirements (e.g., late/false disclosures; failure to comply with ethics agreements where enforceable; obstruction of oversight processes), with judicial review safeguards.¹

Referral authority: standardized referrals to appropriate bodies:

• DOJ for potential criminal violations;
• Inspectors General for agency-specific investigations;
• House/Senate ethics processes for legislative discipline (with respect for constitutional constraints).^{1 6}

Commission structure (independence and legitimacy by design):

A multi-member, bipartisan commission with staggered terms and for-cause removal protections to reduce politicized firing risk.¹

Professional staff with nonpartisan hiring requirements and conflict screens.^{1 2}

Explicit statutory transparency and audit requirements (see Section C).²

Constitutional constraints (built in):

The IPIC does not replace constitutional roles of each branch. It operates as an investigative and civil enforcement body with strong referral mechanics and public reporting—while recognizing that some disciplinary actions remain internal to each branch.⁶

Criminal charging decisions remain within DOJ authority, but the trigger system below constrains when DOJ can keep such decisions fully in-house.^{7 2}

B) Codify an Independent Special Counsel Trigger System (not merely regulatory)

Current special counsel rules are grounded in regulation and depend on DOJ leadership discretion.⁷ The reform makes special counsel protections statutory and automatic for predictable conflict cases.

Trigger principle: When conflicts are structural—not speculative—independent prosecution decisions should be mandatory, not optional.^{2 7}

Trigger categories (illustrative):

Investigations involving the President, Vice President, Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, or senior White House staff where DOJ leadership is conflicted.^{2 7}

Investigations involving cabinet-level officials or agency heads when the relevant department's leadership has a direct conflict.²

High-sensitivity public corruption matters where independence is required to preserve public confidence (e.g., intertwined campaign finance, procurement favoritism, or bribery allegations touching senior leadership).^{2 7}

Selection mechanism (depoliticized):

A standing Independent Selection Panel (e.g., bipartisan former prosecutors/judges with conflict rules) provides a shortlist; DOJ must appoint from the list absent documented disqualification.²

Removal protections and required notification to Congress if removal is sought, ensuring interference becomes visible.²

Guardrails and transparency:

Written justification requirements for declinations or scope reductions in trigger cases (with appropriate redaction for ongoing investigations).²

A public-facing concluding report framework that protects privacy and due process while preventing "black box" closures.²

C) Create a Public Integrity Enforcement Dataset (PIED) + Mandatory Audits

Problem: Today, the public sees scandals and outcomes, not the system performance. That invisibility enables selective enforcement and institutional drift.

Solution: A standardized, machine-readable Public Integrity Enforcement Dataset that tracks—at minimum:

• referrals received (by source category),
• investigations opened/closed,
• declinations (in categories),
• prosecutions initiated and outcomes,
• average time-to-decision benchmarks,
• aggregate enforcement trends over time.^{2 9}

Independent audits:

Regular performance and independence reviews by external oversight (e.g., GAO-style independence principles and periodic audits).¹⁵

Coordination with inspector general independence safeguards and statutory notice requirements to deter politically motivated removals or suppression.¹⁶

D) Lock in "Anti-Interference" Process Protections

The reform codifies key protective norms that currently rely on internal policy—especially for sensitive public official investigations.^{2 8} These include:

• mandatory consultation protocols for certain classes of cases,
• documentation of key investigative approvals/denials,
• limits on informal political contacts, with logging and reporting requirements,
• escalation rules when interference is alleged.²

Impact Analysis

1) Enforcement becomes predictable (reducing both impunity and politicization)

Predictability is the antidote to weaponization. When triggers are statutory and case processing is visible in aggregate, a future administration cannot quietly bury enforcement—or quietly overdo it—without leaving measurable footprints.^{2 7}

2) Institutional resilience improves against resource starvation and organizational sabotage

An independent commission plus mandated datasets and audits reduce vulnerability to quiet dismantling through staffing cuts or unit closures—patterns documented in investigative reporting about integrity enforcement capacity.^{17 18}

3) Economic benefits: reducing "integrity leakage" in procurement and governance

Public procurement is repeatedly identified as a high-risk area for corruption and mismanagement.¹⁴ By increasing detection and deterrence—and by enabling earlier intervention through referrals and data signals—this reform targets one of the largest recurring "loss surfaces" in government operations. Where corruption inflates contract values or diverts funds, even incremental improvements translate into significant fiscal gains.^{13 14}

4) Trust and legitimacy: enabling disagreement without cynicism

Trust does not require unanimity on policy; it requires confidence the rules apply evenly. By building enforcement credibility into the architecture—rather than depending on the virtue of whoever holds office—this reform addresses a central driver of democratic disillusionment.^{10 11 12}

5) Implementation feasibility and cost

The federal government already funds ethics programs, inspectors general, and integrity enforcement offices.^{3 4 9} The reform reallocates, standardizes, and professionalizes these functions under a coherent accountability design—paired with data infrastructure and audit cycles that are inexpensive relative to the scale of potential waste and abuse.^{13 14}

Conclusion

The United States does not need more speeches about ethics—it needs enforcement architecture that can survive politics. When the public believes corruption is a major federal problem and trust remains near historical lows, restoring legitimacy is no longer optional; it is a governance requirement.^{10 11 12}

The Independent Public Integrity Enforcement Act builds that architecture by pairing an independent, cross-branch commission with statutory special counsel triggers and transparent enforcement metrics.^{1 2} It is designed to be fair, constitutional, and durable—so that accountability is not something we hope for every four years, but something the system reliably produces.

Reference List

1. Document A — Independent Anti-Corruption Enforcement (Source Library) - Internal source document.

2. Document B — Independent Public Integrity Enforcement Act (Draft) - Internal draft legislation.

3. Congressional Research Service - Office of Government Ethics: A Primer (Updated Jan. 31, 2025).
   Link: https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10634

4. 5 C.F.R. Part 2638 - Executive Branch Ethics Program.
   Link: https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/5/part-2638

5. Federal Register - Office of Government Ethics… Executive Branch-Wide Ethics Program (discussion of OGE authority and program evolution).
   Link: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-06-06/html/2016-13152.htm

6. Congressional Research Service - House Office of Congressional Ethics: History, Authority, and Procedures (R40760).
   Link: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R40760

7. 28 C.F.R. § 600.1 - Grounds for appointing a Special Counsel.
   Link: https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/28/600.1

8. U.S. Department of Justice - Justice Manual (Public Integrity-related policies; consultation/approval framework).
   Link: https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-85000-election-crimes

9. U.S. Department of Justice, Public Integrity Section - Report to Congress (Annual reporting on public integrity enforcement).
   Link: https://www.justice.gov/criminal/criminal-pin/publications

10. AP-NORC - Topline Poll (Jan. 9–13, 2025): "Corruption… major problem" (Topline).
    Link: https://aapidata.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/AP-NORC-AAPI-DATA-Topline-Poll-9.pdf

11. Pew Research Center - Public Trust in Government: 1958–2025 (Updated Dec. 2025).
    Link: https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2025/12/01/public-trust-in-government-1958-2025/

12. Partnership for Public Service - The State of Public Trust in Government 2024 (PDF).
    Link: https://ourpublicservice.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/State-of-Public-Trust-2024_FINAL.pdf

13. Transparency International - Corruption in Public Procurement (summarizing UNODC estimate ranges and risk discussion).
    Link: https://www.transparency.org/en/news/corruption-in-public-procurement-why-it-matters

14. OECD - Preventing Corruption in Public Procurement (risk framing and controls).
    Link: https://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/Corruption-Public-Procurement-Brochure.pdf

15. U.S. Government Accountability Office - Inspectors General: Principles and Considerations for Reform (GAO-20-639R).
    Link: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-639r

16. Securing Inspector General Independence Act of 2022 - Public Law 117–286 / CRS overview.
    Link: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN12082

17. Reuters Investigates - Reporting on federal public integrity enforcement capacity and organizational weakening (context on vulnerability).
    Link: https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-trump-whistleblowers/

18. AP News - Reporting on reorganization/disbanding of FBI public corruption squad (context on vulnerability). Link: https://apnews.com/article/8e01f8eb542682c3492c0cf3b0ca405c

Changelog

• December 27, 2024 — Fixed MDX syntax errors (removed invalid {#id} heading anchors)
• December 26, 2024 — Initial draft published